Mergers by Lyons, Bruce




Firms propose mergers for many different reasons. For horizontal mergers
they may be buying technology or customers in anticipation of synergies or
economies of scale. For vertical mergers they may see advantages in coordi-
nating activities and reducing transaction costs. For conglomerate mergers,
they may expect economies of scope, perhaps in marketing a product range.
Where technologies are evolving fast and in difﬁcult-to-anticipate directions,
they may even view mergers as an insurance policy or a way to experiment
with new ideas. All these can be claimed as efﬁciencymotives. Mergers are also
a way to change corporate control. The threat of takeover is a discipline
against an ineffective management team. The threat does not always work
and some mergers are proposed by managers seeking personal aggrandise-
ment at the expense of shareholders. Other mergers are a way for a family ﬁrm
to capitalise on its wealth creation when there is no natural successor. A
further motive, of course, is the pursuit of market power. Competition policy
is important even if this is not the object of the merger – efﬁciency or
corporate control motives may still result in mergers that have the effect of
impeding competition.1
The EC Merger Regulation (ECMR) was ﬁrst implemented in 1990.2 The
original test for a merger was that it would not be allowed if it created or
strengthened a dominant position. Notice that it is not the current level of
competition that needs to be assessed, but the change in competition that
1 Empirically, we ﬁnd that many mergers turn out to disappoint shareholders. This is not a concern for
competition policy. Systematically poor selection of mergers by senior managers would suggest that
corporate governance needs reform. It is not the role of a competition authority to act as a management
consultancy. More relevant for competition policy is that ﬁrms often have no clear idea of speciﬁc
efﬁciencies they are hoping to achieve and are rarely able to provide reasonable evidence that they will be
achieved.
2 See Lyons (2008) for an economic assessment of EC merger control.
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would result from themerger. This requires the formation of an expectation of
future competition to be compared with a counterfactual of what would
happen in the absence of the merger. Merger appraisal is therefore subtly
different from Article 81 and 82 investigations which appraise observed
competition.3 The wording of the test was reformed in 2004, replacing the
original dominance test with the prohibition of mergers which would be a
signiﬁcant impediment to effective competition. It is not necessary to go into
the nuances. Sufﬁce it to say that this was not a huge change in merger
appraisal but was a deﬁnite nudge towards more explicit analysis of economic
effects.4 Each of the mergers in this book pre-dates 2004 and some undoubt-
edly contributed to the climate for reform. It is sometimes argued that merger
regulation need not be strict because ﬁrms that ex post exploit their market
position can be investigated under Article 82. However, this is a dangerous
assumption because Article 82 is almost never used to address exploitative
pricing and is cumbersome to apply.
The economic analysis of mergers depends fundamentally on the range of
businesses operated by each ﬁrm. Horizontal mergers between ﬁrms operating
similar businesses raise most direct concern because they eliminate a direct
competitor. This can affect two alternative types of pricing behaviour. First,
the merger may enhance a ﬁrm’s ability unilaterally to raise price. Second, it
may enhance the ability for ﬁrms across the market to coordinate their pricing
even without directly agreeing prices or exchanging information. Vertical and
conglomerate aspects of a merger raise quite different concerns, in particular
the ability to impede the effectiveness of rivals to compete. The six mergers
considered in this part of the book are grouped in pairs according to these
three categories of potential economic effect.
The ﬁrst two chapters provide direct estimates of unilateral effects for hor-
izontal mergers between ﬁrms with overlapping ranges of differentiated pro-
ducts. In such cases, market shares can be misleading. For example, the
combination of two 20 per cent market shares may be either competitively
innocuous (e.g. if consumers do not see the overlapping product ranges of the
merging ﬁrms as effective substitutes) or competitively harmful (e.g. if remain-
ing independent products are seen by customers as ineffective substitutes). It is
therefore important to understand the pattern of substitutability between pro-
ducts (i.e. cross-elasticities of demand). Econometricmethods use hard evidence
3 Nevertheless, proper appraisal of harm and remedy in Articles 81 (other than cartels) and 82 does require
an understanding of the counterfactual of competition in the absence of a business agreement or practice.
4 As already discussed in the introductory chapter, 2004 saw a considerable number of other reforms,
including horizontal merger guidelines. The non-horizontal merger guidelines followed in 2007.
284 Cases in European Competition Policy: The Economic Analysis
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP/379630/WORKINGFOLDER/LYO/9780521886048PTL03.3D 285 [283–290] 11.6.2009 4:26PM
to achieve this. The ﬁrst step is to specify a demand model that captures the
way people choose between alternative products (e.g. logit demand system).
Statistical techniques can be applied to estimate this system from data on past
prices and consumer purchases and so calculate cross-elasticities. An advan-
tage of this approach is that it does not require a black-and-white market
deﬁnition to rule some products into the market and others out. Instead, it
estimates the shades of grey (i.e. cross-elasticities). The estimates can then be
used in conjunction with amodel of pricing behaviour to simulate (i.e. predict)
the impact of a proposed merger.5 The same techniques can be applied to
apparently very different markets such as insurance or beer.
A logit model of consumer choice between non-life insurance companies is
estimated by Gollier and Ivaldi to understand how consumers respond to
price differences between different ﬁrms. Their work was used to advise a
national competition authority about a proposed merger. Identities have been
suppressed to preserve commercial conﬁdentiality. The authors were working
under severe pressure of time in a real merger situation, so this case illustrates
what can be achieved in practice. Having used the limited amount of available
data to estimate own-price elasticities, cross-elasticities and cost functions, the
authors fed these parameters into a merger simulation. Assuming ﬁrms adopt
unilateral pricing, theywere able to estimate expected post-merger price changes.
They predict small and statistically insigniﬁcant long-run price rises. Since
consumers need to recognise and act on price changes, the authors conclude
that the merger should be allowed subject to a remedy of better information for
customers about price offers.
Slade is much less sanguine about the ability of simulation techniques to
estimate unilateral effects. She compares a range of available techniques.
Relatively simple demand models (e.g. logit) are attractive because they can be
implemented in a short period of time and can be understood by non-experts.
However, she argues that their predictions are often misleading. Complex
models are more reliable but they require more time to implement and are less
transparent (e.g. the econometrician has to make some subtle judgements). She
illustrates the use of merger simulations and the sensitivity of predictions to
modelling choices with an application to mergers in the UK brewing industry.
Slade’s estimates were not done under the pressure of an investigation and they
include work that would have been too time-consuming to achieve during a live
5 With much less econometric sophistication Davies and Lyons (2007) apply a much simpliﬁed form of
merger simulation to be used as an indicator of possible effects (rather than as potentially decisive
evidence). They provide estimates for six paper and pharmaceuticals mergers previously investigated by
the EC.
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case. She assesses the merger between S&N and Courage, which was allowed by
the UK authorities without horizontal remedy, and the proposed merger
between Bass and Carlsberg–Tetley, which was eventually blocked. She ﬁnds
substantial differences in the estimated effects of each depending on the speci-
ﬁcation of the econometric demand model. She concludes that merger simula-
tions should not be decisive but they should be used to focus analysis away from
crude market shares and towards the degree of brand substitutability.
The next two chapters address a different type of price concern. This is that
the merger might facilitate the coordination of prices. For our purposes, we
can consider tacit collusion, collective dominance and coordinated effects as
equivalent terms for when ﬁrms observe each other’s behaviour and eschew
proﬁtable price cuts in the short runwith a view tomaintaining long-term high
prices.6 In addition to legal considerations, coordinated effects differ from an
explicit cartel because it is much more difﬁcult to reach an implicit agreement
over price, let alone monitor it, without explicit communication. Although
unilateral effects is the main line of argument in most European merger cases,
conﬁdence in arguing a collective dominance theory of harm rose through the
1990s until the 2002 Airtours appeal, which is the subject of one of our case
studies. There are important differences in the analysis of coordinated com-
pared with unilateral effects. In particular, it places a greater burden on
understanding the behaviour of all major ﬁrms in the market, not just the
merging parties. Coordination is more likely when market shares are fairly
symmetric because this balances the incentives to undercut and to respond to
rivals undercutting. It appears to be very difﬁcult if there are more than two or
three major ﬁrms in the market. The presence of a competitive ‘maverick’with
an aggressive business strategy can also disrupt coordination.
In 1999, the EC prohibited the merger of two package holiday operators,
Airtours and First Choice, on the grounds of collective dominance. The merger
would have reduced the number of major competitors from four to three. This
decision turned out to be a landmark case for the application of economics in
competition cases. The EC decision was appealed and the appeal upheld. In
rejecting the EC reasoning, the CFI made explicit reference to the game theoretic
underpinnings of the theory of tacit collusion to provide what have become
known as the Airtours Criteria. These set out three conditions necessary for
coordinated effects to be feasible: sufﬁcient price transparency for rivals to know
6 Tacit collusion is the traditional term used by economists. Collective dominance was the term used by the
EC prior to the 2004 ECMR revision, since when ‘coordinated effects’ has been used. The reasons behind
the different terminology are legal more than economic.
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when one is cutting price, a credible response (‘punishment’) by other ﬁrms to
exert a discipline on those who deviate from the collusion and the absence of
‘external’ constraints in the form of new or smaller ﬁrms expanding output in
response to higher prices by the market leaders or of consumers switching to
other products. Garces-Tolon, Neven and Seabright (two of whom advised on
opposite sides in the appeal) take the opportunity to review the academic
literature in order to clarify how the conditions favouring tacit collusion and
the realistic expectation of collusive behaviour can each be established. They go
on to assess the impact of the CFI decision and the extent to which the Court’s
criteria provide a reliable guide for the analysis of other markets.
A sequence of mergers in the newsprint and magazine paper industry had
increased market concentration in the 1990s. There were also allegations of
cartel activity. It is, perhaps, not surprising that the EC was highly suspicious
of the proposed UPM Kymmene/Norske Skog/Haindl merger. Combined
market shares for these relatively homogeneous products were insufﬁcient
to suggest that the merger would result in signiﬁcant unilateral effects, but the
merger would eliminate a potentially disruptive maverick in Haindl and the
EC concern was for coordinated effects. However, the EC theory of harm was
not conventional. The lack of price transparency in individually negotiated
contracts meant price coordination was not very plausible. Instead, the EC
considered the likelihood that ﬁrms would jointly limit capacity expansion in
order to keep prices high. Kühn and Van Reenen argue that the irreversibility
of investment makes capacity coordination highly unlikely. They go on to
show that their theory of competitive behaviour was more consistent with the
empirical evidence than was the EC hypothesis. After a thorough Phase II
investigation, the EC agreed and cleared the merger without need for remedy.
Most mergers with vertical or conglomerate dimensions also have an
element of horizontal overlap and the multiplicity of effects often makes
them complex to analyse. The last two cases fall into this category, though
one focuses on vertical effects and the other on conglomerate effects. The
latter has become another important test case. Like for agreements, vertical
and conglomerate effects in mergers should start from a different presump-
tion to horizontal mergers because they are more likely to be benign. Such
cases can also put a competition authority under different pressures because
the main theory of harm is that rivals will be foreclosed. This can lead to ﬁerce
lobbying against the merger by rivals whomay be motivated by either genuine
fear of anticompetitive foreclosure or commercial concern about facing a
more competitive rival. The role of economics is to identify which should be
the true concern.
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Themerger of Neste Oy and IVO brought together the national monopoly in
gas distribution with the largest supplier of electricity in Finland. Both ﬁrms
were largely owned by the Finnish state and the merger was encouraged by
the Finnish Ministry of Trade and Industry to create a ‘national champion’ in
anticipation of the opening of the international electricity market. The merger
had horizontal, vertical and conglomerate dimensions. Although gas and elec-
tricity are substitutes for some purposes, the main concern in this case was in
vertical issues because gas is a signiﬁcant element in the fuel mix for electricity
generation. Neste owned the pipelines and all Finland’s natural gas was
imported from Russia in a joint venture owned 75 per cent by Neste and
25 per cent by Gazprom. Much hinged on the expected future evolution of
the market. At the time, 1998, the form of electricity regulation was still being
decided and there was only light regulation of gas. Increasing transmission
capacity was planned for electricity between the Nordic countries and this was
expected to remove IVO’s dominance in Finland. Swedish generators were
expected to invest in gas-powered plant in Finland near the Russian border in
order to diversify their fuel sources. However, Stenbacka argues that themerged
entity would be well placed to create entry barriers through its investment and
pricing policies. He also argues that there would be no synergies that could not
be reaped by appropriate contracts short of joint ownership. The ECdecided the
merger would impede competition but that a satisfactory remedy was to reduce
state ownership of the joint venture with Gazprom to below 50 per cent so the
electricity generator would not control the gas supply of its potential rivals.
GE/Honeywell was a merger proposal between two major American ﬁrms
and it was destined to create substantial transatlantic tension and debate.
Because of the global reach of their sales, the merger was investigated by both
US and European authorities: it passed US scrutiny subject only to a small
divestment; it was prohibited on a number of grounds by the EC; and the
prohibition was upheld by the CFI only on narrow grounds and with consider-
able criticism of other aspects of the EC decision. GE was a huge conglomerate
with activities including large global market shares in a wide range of aircraft
engines and power systems. It also had enormous ﬁnancial strength including a
business called GECAS, which bought and leased aircraft to airlines and
accounted for 10 per cent of new aircraft sales. Honeywell was the global leader
in avionics, engine controls and power systems, and made a limited range of
aircraft engines. This was a very complex merger with horizontal, vertical and
conglomerate issues in an array of markets. The horizontal effects were relatively
straightforward, though the case raised tricky issues about how to measure
market share (e.g. when there is a joint venture) and how meaningful is market
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share when airlines ﬁnd maintenance easier if all their engines come from one
supplier and when there is bidding for engine sales. There were also interesting
vertical issues, particularly relating to engine starters and to the GECAS policy of
buying only GE engines with the possibility of extending that policy to
Honeywell avionics and non-avionics. However, the most controversial element
of the EC decision related to conglomerate effects. In particular, the EC argued
that GE engines would be bundled with Honeywell products and this would
foreclose rival suppliers who did not have the product range to offer bundled
discounts. Vives and Stafﬁero provide an economic critique of all aspects of the
EC decision, with particular detail on the bundling arguments. They also observe
a signiﬁcant transatlantic difference, not so much in the underlying economic
analysis, as in the willingness of the EU authorities to consider possible long-
term consequences while the US focuses on more certain short-term effects.
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